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In the opening chapter of Conversational realities, John Shotter wrote that “each new 
approach in psychology has to struggle in from the margins to a place in the centre” (1993a, 
p. 5). Those in the centre of the discipline, he continued, can draw upon “an order of 
meanings” in order to exclude all those who do not fit their “orderly, tranquil world with 
everything in its expected place” (p. 5). He was, of course, speaking from personal 
experience. Throughout his time as an academic, Shotter has criticised orthodox, 
experimental psychology, not because he objected to a specific theory or to a particular study, 
but because he was deeply dissatisfied with the underlying assumptions and the routine 
practices of experimental psychology as a whole. Shotter has wanted to uproot the basis of 
mainstream psychological thinking and to replace it with new, more humane ways of thinking 
about psychological issues. Unsurprisingly the psychological establishment did not look 
kindly upon John Shotter’s project, especially in the early days.  
Today, it is hard to appreciate just how narrow the psychological establishment was in the 
1970s. ‘Proper’ psychologists, who held the senior positions within the discipline, did not 
treat Shotter as if he was producing an interesting new approach, with which they might not 
agree but which deserved attention. He was considered a shameful renegade, a heretic beyond 
the bounds of decent psychological society – someone who had no right to be employed in a 
department of psychology. Shotter’s scholarship, far from being a saving grace, only made 
matters worse. Orthodox experimentalists viewed his deep knowledge of Wittgenstein and of 
philosophy generally with great suspicion. They believed that Shotter was trying to hand back 
their discipline to unscientific philosophers, as if he were plotting to reverse a century of 
scientific advance so that psychology would once again be a mere adjunct to philosophy. It 
was little wonder that Shotter felt the full force of a disciplinary centre protecting its 
privileged position.  
I want to suggest in this chapter that those psychologists, who rejected everything that Shotter 
stood for, were correct at least by their own lights: Shotter was indeed threatening their ways 
of doing psychology and he did not offer the possibility of intellectual rapprochement with 
the mainstream. Over the years, Shotter’s language has been uncompromising, criticising 
orthodox psychology for upholding a mechanistic model of humans which is derived from 
Cartesian philosophy (e.g. Shotter, 1975 and 1984). In his view, such a model is not just 
empirically unsuited for studying the complexities of human life but, worse still, it has 
“pernicious moral effects” (Shotter, 2005a, p. 157).  
Moreover, Shotter’s project was blurring the distinction between empirical psychology and 
non-empirical philosophy, as was Rom Harré’s parallel move from philosophy towards 
creating an ethnographic social psychology (e.g, Harré, 1979). Most mainstream 
psychologists believe that historically psychologists had to struggle free from the hold of 
philosophy in order to create an independent, scientific discipline. Their self-image as 
scientists demands that they maintain the boundary between psychology and the unscientific 
humanities, in which they class philosophy. Shotter threatens this boundary and accordingly 
his ideas needed to be ignored or curtly rejected: for example, Tetlock (1986) dismissed 
Shotter’s Social accountability and selfhood, as “unpersuasive”, “frustrating” and “neither 
novel nor particularly compelling” (p. 75). As we shall see, the critics are not entirely wrong: 
those that Shotter calls his “textual friends” tend to be philosophers from the past rather than 
experimental psychologists of today (1993b, p. 232). Indeed, the very notion of “textual 
friends”, it will be suggested, reveals much about Shotter and his ideas. 
Nowadays, Shotter is no longer the lone voice that he once might have appeared to be. The 
past fifteen years have seen a growth of approaches which would have angered 
experimentalists back in the 1970s: social constructionism, discursive psychology, critical 
psychology, Dialogical Self Theory and so on. These approaches have been slowly edging 
towards the centre. Experimentalism no longer holds the absolute sway that it once did. 
Psychologists following critical approaches can be found in many departments of 
psychology, especially in the United Kingdom. The British Psychological Society now 
recommends that undergraduate students of psychology should be taught qualitative methods 
and the Society particularly mentions discursive psychology as something that 
undergraduates should know about.  
Even so, Shotter remains a long-term outsider. Rather than throwing in his lot with one or 
other of the new forms of psychology, he has kept himself somewhat apart. Although his 
book Conversational realities bears the sub-title Constructing life through language, Shotter 
has not associated himself with discursive psychology, which investigates in detail how the 
social world is constructed through language and how we engage conversationally with 
others. I will be suggesting that Shotter has not stood apart out of a perverse desire to inhabit 
the margins no matter what or who is positioned within the centre. Shotter’s vision of how we 
should seek to understand psychological matters depends upon not having a fixed theory 
and/or methodology, even if that theory and/or methodology were developed in opposition to 
the Cartesian tradition.  
I will illustrate this point in relation to two important features of Shotter’s thinking. He 
emphasises that each psychological event is unique and also that human acts are not 
performed in isolation but are properly speaking joint acts. However, as I shall argue, these 
two aspects of Shotter’s thinking, important though they might be, are not in themselves 
sufficient to account for Shotter’s distinctive view of psychology. What is crucial is the 
character of his textual friends. These scholarly ‘friendships’ demonstrate Shotter’s 
commitment to a deeply philosophical view of psychological issues.  
In this regard, Shotter resembles one of his philosophical textual acquaintances – Ernst 
Cassirer. Just as Cassirer took issue with the aim of producing a detached, technical 
philosophy, so Shotter rejects a ‘pure’ psychology, detached from philosophical 
understanding. Most importantly, the parallels between Shotter and Cassirer enable us to 
appreciate the intellectual community to which Shotter has attached himself and why writing 
practices, as contrasted with theory and/or methodology, continue to be so important to his 
project for a different form of psychology. 
 
Uniquely Occurring Events 
At the heart of Shotter’s vision of what it is to be human lies a belief in the uniqueness of 
each moment in our lives. As he writes in the opening pages of Wittgenstein in practice, the 
idea of life being composed of “once occurrent, never to be repeated novel events” is central 
to his thinking (Shotter, 2012, p. 2). According to Shotter, we all live on the edge of 
“unrepeatable, irreversible time” and because we always live in the present moment, “we are 
always, to an extent, living with novelty, with the unique and particular, the unrepeated and 
unrepeatable” (p. 3). By contrast, conventional psychological theories aim to classify 
behaviour or states of mind, as if they are to all intents and purposes just like other 
behaviours or states of mind.  For example, a psychologist might say that a particular person 
is suffering from ‘status anxiety’ or is ‘deindividuated’ or is feeling ‘learned helplessness’. In 
so doing, the psychologist is assimilating the person to a general category and the unique 
aspects of that person, their experiences and their situation are ignored. In this way, 
conventional psychological categories cannot but simplify experience.  
Shotter’s aim is to escape from general theories and categories, in order to construct a way of 
looking at human life that is capable of recapturing the uniqueness of each moment. For 
many years, Shotter has been attracted to Wittgenstein, his very best textual friend, not least 
because Wittgenstein tells us to observe the particularities of language and thereby of life. 
Wittgenstein, in his later philosophy, abandoned all technical concepts, believing that 
philosophers have continually misused language to create pseudo-problems. In order to break 
free of pseudo-problems, he urged again and again in Philosophical investigations (1953) that 
we should look at ordinary moments in life without preconceptions. As Shotter puts it, 
Wittgenstein does not proceed by “seeking generalities, universal laws or principles couched 
in special terms”; instead Wittgenstein discusses “the particular details of events occurring 
within especially selected interpersonal episodes in the ordinary everyday terms that, 
spontaneously, make sense to us” (2012, p. 3).  
By examining how we use language, we can begin to notice the little things that we generally 
overlook. This is just what Shotter wants to do with his psychological inquiries. We might 
notice an aspect of Shotter’s own style of writing that seems so obvious that it is easy to 
overlook: his continual quoting from the writing of his textual friends. In this respect, he 
differs from Wittgenstein, who hardly ever quoted other writers. When discussing the novel 
aspects of human life, Shotter frequently uses the phrase “once occurrent”, referring for 
example to “once occurrent events of being” (Shotter and van Lawick, 2014, p. 28). The 
phrase is apt, but Shotter never claims it as his own. Most properly, he attributes it to Bakhtin 
and particularly to Bakhtin’s book Toward a philosophy of the act, often quoting from page 
93 of that book.  
One might think that there is nothing remarkable in this for it is only right that scholars 
should attribute correctly what they take from other scholars. Only spectacular failures of 
scholarly etiquette need be noted. But, in the present case, that would be to miss the point. 
Shotter may be discussing novelty, and may be claiming that the vast majority of 
psychologists slavishly fail to notice the novelty of ordinary moments. However, even when 
he argues in this way, he is keen not to claim novelty for his own ideas. He presents his own 
thinking in relation to the works of those past thinkers who have inspired him and whose 
words he constantly quotes.  
It might seem supremely arrogant to declare that modern psychology is empirically and 
morally wrong-headed, but Shotter is not advancing himself, as if he is the sole prophet who 
can put his psychological colleagues on the road to intellectual redemption. He is not merely 
criticising present thinking but, as he cites the works of others, Shotter links himself to an 
unbroken chain of past thinkers. More than this, he ensures that his own readers must read his 
textual friends, for to read Shotter is always to read selected passages from others, especially 
Wittgenstein and Bakhtin. In effect, he is saying to his readers ‘read this bit of Bakhtin, read 
this bit of Wittgenstein; and then think.’  
It is not just Bakhtin, who asserts the uniqueness of every moment of life. Henri Bergson and 
William James, both textual friends of Shotter, argued for a similar point. William James is 
famous for his metaphor of the stream of consciousness (1890, chapter nine). Just as a stream 
continually flows downwards to the sea or to a bigger river, never to return in its present 
state, so a person’s mind continues onward through time. We may think we have had the 
same thought before and we may think we see the same object that we saw earlier, but, 
according to James, we are failing to notice minute differences between then and now. We 
are ready to assimilate what is a unique experience to a general category – to say ‘I am seeing 
my pencil’ or ‘I am feeling sad’, as if all views of my pencil are absolutely identical or as if 
all feelings of sadness are the same. In the same way, Bergson, claimed that language, 
especially the technical language of psychologists, blunts the psychological uniqueness of the 
moment (see, for instance, Time and free will, 1913/2001, pp. 160ff). 
The very methodology of experimental psychology, as it is currently practised and taught, is 
designed to eliminate this sort of uniqueness. The modern experiment needs sufficient 
participants so that averaged group data, rather than data from individual participants, can be 
computed and compared. In this way, high and low scorers on any test will become averaged 
out, with their unique reactions becoming part of an overall group score. As Gerd Gigerenzer 
(2004 and 2006) has argued, this method protects the researcher from examining what actual 
people do in the experimental situation, and the mean score may not represent the reactions of 
any individual participant.  
Moreover, in claiming that variable X has significantly affected the behaviour of participants, 
researchers typically do not have an idea how many of the participants were affected by 
variable X. Statistically significant differences can be obtained even if only a minority of 
participants have been affected, but researchers often use a rhetoric which implies that it is 
the majority without having any idea how many actually were (Billig, 2013). Of course, 
defenders of orthodox experimental methods are likely to claim that this is the inevitable 
consequence of being scientific. The argument is that being scientific means being 
experimental and this means comparing groups of data in ways which treat individual 
variations as ‘noise’: only by using statistical procedures, which cancel out this random 
‘noise’, can we detect whether variable X has or has not affected responses in the 
experimental situation. 
However, psychological experiments need not involve either multiple participants or 
statistical procedures that average out differences in response. As Kurt Danziger (1990) has 
demonstrated, the early experiments of Wilhelm Wundt tended to involve single, high-status 
subjects, who were called ‘observers’, because they observed stimuli and their own reactions 
to those stimuli. According to Danziger, Wundt’s style of experimentation, with its close 
analysis of the single participant, fell out of fashion from about 1912 onwards without ever 
having been shown to be erroneous or unscientific. 
Moreover, one of the most important figures in the history of modern social psychology 
advocated the use of experiments to examine what happens in a particular situation on a 
particular occasion. Kurt Lewin is often referred to as ‘the father of modern social 
psychology’ and those who use the phrase assume that Lewin pioneered the sort of 
controlled, statistically analysed experiment that has become widespread within social 
psychology (Billig, in press a and b; Delouvée, Kalampalikis and Pétard, 2011). Lewin 
(1938a) argued strongly that the purpose of experiments was to provide opportunities for the 
researcher to observe how patterns of behaviour developed in concrete situations. According 
to Lewin, it was better scientific practice to observe the particular, unique case than to 
average out multiple cases. In fact, Lewin claimed that the use of statistical analysis was 
retrograde within psychology, encouraging an old-fashioned Aristotelian mentality rather 
than a genuinely scientific Galileian outlook (Lewin, 1931/1999). Thus, the so-called ‘father 
of modern social psychology’ criticised the sort of artificial experiment, which uses multiple 
occurrences of the same situation and whose results are statistically analysed in ways 
designed to reduce the variations of unique occurrences.  
The reason for mentioning this is not that either Kurt Lewin or Wilhelm Wundt conducted the 
sort of psychological inquiry that John Shotter has been arguing for. That would be 
completely mistaken. The reason for mentioning Wundt and Lewin’s commitment to 
studying the single case is simpler: it suggests that Shotter’s psychological vision does not 
rest solely upon the assumption of the uniqueness of each psychological event. Such an 
assumption may be a necessary feature of his vision but it is not a sufficient one: it is still 
possible to believe in uniqueness and yet conduct psychological experiments, albeit of a 
different character than the grouped-based, variable-upon-variable design that has become 
standard in psychology. Shotter’s vision encompasses other assumptions which take him 
beyond an experimental approach. 
 
The importance of joint action 
According to Shotter, one of the biggest mistakes that Cartesian psychology makes is that it 
looks for the origins of action within the head of the actor. In Conversational realities he 
writes that Cartesianism was based on the “ambition to locate a world beyond the historical 
and social, and to attempts to discover this world in the depths of the supposed organic or 
psychic nature of the individual, or, perhaps, in larger abstract systems or principles to which 
the individual was supposedly subject” (1993a, p. 7). He went on to quote Ernst Cassirer 
(1951), who claimed that the “systematising spirit” of the Enlightenment has continued to 
persist despite the failure of its systems. Shotter commented that this systematising spirit 
remains “implicit in modern psychology” (1993a, p. 24). Again drawing on Cassirer, Shotter 
suggested in Cultural politics of everyday life that the emphasis upon analysis and the desire 
to use analysis to produce systematic representation “still characterise much of our thinking 
in the ‘human sciences’ today” (1993b, p. 10). This systematising sort of psychology is 
highly individualistic: when it comes to explaining the roots of action, it looks no further than 
the motives and cognitions of the individual actor. The assumption is that action is an 
outward representation of psychological processes which are located within the mind. If these 
inner mental processes can be systematically represented then psychologists will have solved 
the riddle of action. 
Drawing upon a number of textual friends, most principally Bakhtin, Volosinov and 
Wittgenstein, Shotter argues that action is not the product of the individual considered in 
isolation. Our actions are socially situated and this means that we act in relation to others, 
being responsive to their actions. Thus, Shotter uses the concept of ‘joint action’. We should 
not seek to understand why people say what they do in terms of the speaker’s prior 
psychological state. Shotter follows Bakhtin in placing utterances within a dialogical context, 
taking on board Bakhtin’s principle that each utterance is responsive to other utterances. 
Shotter quotes Bakhtin’s remark (1986, p. 91) that “any concrete utterance is a link in a chain 
of communication…utterances are not indifferent to one another, and are not self-sufficient; 
they are aware of and mutually reflect one another”. Shotter comments on this quotation from 
Bakhtin: “Indeed, even as we speak, as we formulate our utterances, we must take account of 
the ‘voices’ of others” (Shotter, 1993b, p. 120; see also Shotter and Billig, 1998). 
This even applies to brief exclamations which appear at first sight to express inner feelings. 
Shotter (1999) pays particular attention to an episode which Volosinov (1986) describes in 
Marxism and the philosophy of language. Two Russian friends are sitting together in late 
May after a long, exhausting winter. One turns to the other and simply exclaims “Well!” In 
that one word is expressed all the tiredness that the speaker feels. According to Shotter, the 
word is not merely addressed to the friend, but it is responsively addressed to the conditions 
that they both have endured. The word expresses so much more than an individual emotion; it 
is the sharing of a world that is almost unbearably difficult.  
In emphasising the dialogical nature of talk, Shotter is again insisting on a moral dimension 
that runs parallel to the psychological dimension.  He is not just saying that as a matter of fact 
we are social beings, creating joint realities with our deeds and utterances. He is asserting that 
it is morally correct that we should be social in our outlook. This is where Cartesianism falls 
down both ethically and analytically. Shotter (2011) writes that “those within a ‘situation’ 
feel required to conform to the ‘things’ within it, not because of their material shape, but 
because we all call upon each other, ethically, to recognize and respect what exists ‘between’ 
us”. In this way, the situation which we create with another is neither “mine” nor “yours”, but 
it is something “to which we can both contribute: it is ‘ours’” (2011, p. 2). By contrast the 
Cartesian seeks both a monological understanding and practice; the person who speaks 
monologically “is saying in effect: ‘Instead of us all living in a reality of our own making, all 
the rest of you must live in my reality!’” (p.2, emphasis in original). 
 
Shotter connects the notion of joint action with the idea that psychological events are unique 
and thereby unpredictable. We are constantly creating new situations with others. Even if we 
could formulate a description of an individual’s inner state, we would be unable to predict 
accurately how that person would react in relation to another and what joint responses the 
two would produce. As Shotter (2011) puts it, “when someone acts, their activity cannot be 
accounted as wholly their own activity – for a person’s acts are, among other influences, 
partly ‘shaped’ by the acts of the others around them” (p. 2). This is what makes joint actions, 
so special: “they are continuously creative of new responses” (p. 2). 
 
The analyst might think probabilistically and claim that each new situation resembles other 
situations and in many of those other situations people react in an identifiable sort of way. 
But we cannot know in advance that these particular persons will react in the particular way 
that they do. Volosinov could not have known in advance that the particular Russian, and not 
his friend, would at that precise moment say ‘Well!’ with the exact intonation that he did. 
Only after the event has occurred is it possible to try to understand the shared moment of the 
two friends. 
 
Another example might help to illustrate the intrinsically unpredictable nature of shared 
action and how probabilistic thinking only underlines this unpredictability. The example 
comes from the world of professional cycling. It concerns a former French professional 
cyclist, who was well known for his daring but typically unsuccessful attempts to win races 
by launching an early breakaway from the ‘peloton’, or the main body of cyclists. Normally 
the leaders of the peloton would catch and overtake him before the end of the race. That did 
not deter him from trying again and again because there was always the remote chance that 
he might be lucky. The cyclist referred to what he called les aléas or those unforeseen 
possibilities that might fortuitously combine to favour him every now and again. When he 
won a notable race, les aléas had combined in his favour: just as the advancing peloton 
approached a level crossing, the gates closed to allow a train to pass. All predictions based on 
riders’ training patterns, their internal physiological states, their present form and the 
strategies of their teams would be unable to predict that particular outcome. One might 
predict that ninety-nine times out of a hundred his breakaway would fail, but statistical 
knowledge would be incapable of predicting when that hundredth time would occur, when 
the level-crossing gates would fortuitously close at just the right moment. As the French 
cyclist remarked: “In cycling nothing is ever set in stone, there’s always un élément 
perturbateur and I take advantage of it” (Leonard, 2014, p. 174). 
 
Les aléas are not confined to the world of cycle racing but they attend all social life, 
restricting prediction to probabilistic guesswork. As Gigerenzer (2008) has demonstrated, 
psychological theories are poor at predicting real-life outcomes in advance – indeed lay 
persons typically do better than specialist theories, which are much better equipped to offer 
explanations after the event. The example of the cyclist and his aléas is particularly 
appropriate in relation to Shotter’s understanding of the world. The young John Shotter was 
himself a talented and successful competitive cyclist. Racing for the Fareham Wheelers, 
Shotter won the junior British Southern Counties championship in 1952. Many years later, he 
still knows that the whole race has to be run – the world has to be jointly lived moment by 
moment – in order to know the outcomes. Afterwards the outcomes will need to be 
understood in terms of the unique conjunction of circumstances that occurred on that 
occasion. If sports journalists know that they cannot file their reports in advance of the race, 
so psychologists should not believe that one day they will be able to do so. 
 
 
Dialogue and uniqueness 
The insistence that action is joint and dialogical, together with the assumption of the 
uniqueness of events, is still not sufficient to give Shotter’s work its distinctive colouring. 
Even Lewin could, at a pinch, be interpreted as accepting the jointness of action: after all, he 
insisted on the importance of understanding the individual’s ‘life-space’ in terms of the 
group’s ‘life-space’ (Lewin, 1948 and 1951; see also Billig, in press a). Yet Lewin’s 
psychology represent the antithesis of Shotter’s. Lewin was deeply influenced by the model 
of physics, proposing that psychology should be written in the highly mathematized language 
of field theory, in which geometric representations of the life-space, as well as mathematical 
formulae depicting underlying psychological valences, were to be accepted as accurate 
representations of the mind (see, for instance, Lewin, 1938b). Nothing could be further from 
Shotter’s descriptions of what he calls the dialogically structured mind (Shotter, 1999). 
 
By the same token Shotter does not associate his project with approaches that advocate 
rigorous, detailed examination of dialogical interaction. This is illustrated by his attitude 
towards conversation analysis and to discursive psychology which has taken up the 
conversation analytic approach (see, inter alia, Edwards, 2012; Edwards and Potter, 1993; 
Potter, 2012). At first sight one might suppose that Shotter would approve of this move 
towards a conversation analytic psychology, for he shares a number of its assumptions: 
namely, an opposition to conventional cognitive psychology which looks to the internal mind 
of the individual; a sense that psychological phenomena are produced though dialogical 
interaction; a commitment to search for the construction of meaning within interaction 
between people. Yet, Shotter makes few comments about conversation analysis and he does 
not see his own project as leading to the sorts of detailed studies of conversational interaction, 
which distinguish conversation analysis generally and discursive psychology in particular. 
 
Shotter (2008) briefly referred to conversation analysis when discussing the indefiniteness of 
language and Bakhtin’s view that utterances are responses. He supports this view by referring 
to Schegloff (1995) as having shown how in conversational interaction we set up expectant 
relationships with others about what is yet come. However, Shotter does not then go into the 
sort of details that characterise Schegloff’s analyses of conversations. Similarly, in a recent 
article Shotter (in press) dismisses most social scientific disciplines, or what he characterises 
as “ologies”, as being monological. He does not then contrast these “ologies” with dialogical 
disciplines such as conversation analysis or discursive psychology which are devoted to 
analysing in detail how participants construct meaning within their joint conversational 
interaction. 
 
We might ask why Shotter should stand back from projects such as conversation analysis or 
discursive psychology, which are dialogical in their outlook and methodology. There are two 
factors which might help to explain Shotter’s caution. The first relates to his approach 
towards the uniqueness of events and the second to the sort of language that he advocates that 
we as investigators should try to use. 
 
It is possible to recognize the uniqueness of events but to consider it as an obstacle to 
theorising. This essentially is the statistical approach within psychology: by collecting and 
statistically analysing data from multiple cases, the researcher disposes of particularities. 
Arguably, it could be said that many conversation analysts approach their data in a way that 
aspires to go beyond the particularities of the individual extracts of conversation that they 
study so closely. Typically conversation analysts seek to identify common patterns of 
conversational interaction, such as adjacency pairs, transition relevance places, extreme case 
formulations etc, which can be found in many different contexts. In this way, one aim is to 
produce general statements about the mechanics of such phenomena and then understand 
individual episodes in terms of these general mechanics (see Billig, 2013, chapter seven). As 
such, much conversation analysis possesses a methodological dynamic which moves from the 
intensive study of particular episodes to discovering more general features of conversational 
interaction. In this dynamic, the unique features of the examples give way to features which 
are common to instances, such that the analyst moves from studying this particular transition 
relevance place or adjacency pair to transition relevance places or adjacency pairs in general. 
 
Although Shotter might appreciate the intensive study of particular dialogical examples, he 
does not treat particular examples as a step towards formulating general theoretical 
statements. By contrast, he seeks to draw out the particularities of the example. His use of 
Volosinov’s example of the two Russian speakers is a case in point. Shotter does not regret 
the absence of a transcribed recording of the occasion. He is not seeking to discover the 
implicit codes of interaction that the two were following, speculating on the gap between the 
previous remark, whatever it might have been, and the expressed ‘Well!’ Nor is he greatly 
concerned about how the second person reacted to that single word. He is concerned to draw 
out the special nature of that shared moment – how that single word, uttered at that particular 
moment, could convey so much. 
 
Similarly, Shotter (2013) in his characteristic style begins a paper with several quotations. 
Four of them come from intellectual books. The fifth comes from a conversation between a 
psychiatric patient in a secure unit and the unit’s Nurse Manager. The dialogue begins with 
the patient saying: 
 
“Can I talk with you Cherrie (Nurse Manager of a Secure Unit)”? 
 “Yes, but Dr Ashong is your psychiatrist, why don’t you talk with her?” 
 “I can’t find my words when I’m with Dr. Ashong.” 
 
This example carries more than an echo of Kurt Goldstein, another of Shotter’s textual 
friends (Shotter and van Lawik, 2014). Goldstein, who was Cassirer’s cousin, studied the 
aphasia of patients suffering from brain damage (Goldstein, 1948). In his analyses, Goldstein 
warned against linking the symptom of seemingly being unable to speak with specific brain 
injuries, as if the latter automatically produced the former. Instead, Goldstein argued for a 
holisitic approach, seeking to understand the whole person as being more than the sum of 
their cognitive and physiological parts.  
Goldstein (1939 and 1951) used the Gestaltist metaphor of figure-ground to illustrate the 
complex links between outward behaviour and physiological deficit. The physiological 
pattern is itself a figure which must always appear against a wider background. However, 
neuro-psychologists tend to overlook the background and treat the figure as if it had objective 
characteristics in its own right. The inability to speak is not necessarily absolute despite the 
physiological injury but the person may have difficulties with speaking in particular 
situations (Goldstein, 1951). Shotter resonated to Goldstein’s holism: we can understand the 
patient who loses their words on a particular occasion, when speaking with a particular 
person. At other moments they may recover some of their words. The general term ‘aphasia’ 
does injustice to this complexity (see Ludwig, 2012, for an extended discussion of 
Goldstein’s holism). 
 
A conversation analyst might treat the example of Cherrie talking to Dr Ashong’s patient as 
an instance of a more general conversational gambit, such as formulating a request, which is 
not met with an outright refusal but with a counter-request.  Shotter, by contrast, is not asking 
us to compare the exchange with other exchanges where the speakers use similar 
conversational forms. Instead, he is asking his readers to listen to what the patient was saying 
on this particular occasion and how the patient’s words contain specific insights about 
themselves. If we do this we can see, along with Goldstein, why the patient’s loss of words 
was not a simple symptom but a dialogical reaction. We are to listen - just as Shotter and 
Volosinov ask us to listen to what the one Russian said to the other and what in consequence 
both could share. For Shotter these are special moments, to be appreciated in their 
particularity, not to be absorbed into a wider category. 
 
 
Poetics as Methodology 
Even if we assume that it is important to recognise the particularity of events, there is still the 
problem of how we might express this understanding of the unique moment. The earlier 
quotation from Bergson illustrates how difficult the problem is. Most psychological terms are 
general categories and psychologists often act as if the prime purpose of psychological 
investigation is to categorise psychological phenomena. Whenever psychologists categorise 
in this way – no matter what the psychological phenomenon that they are categorising – they 
are treating the various different instances of what they are categorising as if they were all 
functionally the same.  
 
For this reason, Shotter argues psychology needs more than just a change of theoretical 
concepts or methodological procedures. It requires new ways of writing, or to use Shotter’s 
term, new ‘poetics’. Shotter’s earlier work was not concerned with the issue of poetics, as he 
was concentrating on understanding what was going wrong with conventional psychology. 
However, as he has turned his attention to the implications of seeking to understand uniquely 
occurring events as shared actions, so he has seen it as vital to create new rhetorical forms of 
understanding (Shotter, 2005a).  
 
The interest in rhetoric, however, was always there. When Shotter (1993a) described his 
approach as “social constructionist”, he added that his was “a rhetorical-responsive version” 
of social constructionism (pp. 12f). Not only was he implying that the concept “social 
constructionist” was too broad to fit his particular vision, but also that his vision was itself 
deeply rhetorical. This means that psychology itself cannot be treated as something apart 
from the rest of human activity: it must recognize itself as being a rhetorical, responsive 
activity. This, of course, applies just as much to the construction of a counter-psychology as it 
does to the continuation of mainstream psychology. 
 
The term ‘poetics’ is itself highly rhetorical and critical. Shotter is trying to shift 
psychological writing from using heavy scientific categories to a lighter, more literary style 
which is able to capture the feel of the moment. When Shotter (2005a) writes of the need to 
create “methods of social poetics” (p. 160), he is not using the term “methods” in its normal 
sense of ordered procedures for gathering and assessing data.  He has in mind styles of 
writing which will draw out the uniqueness of events. Following the lead of Wittgenstein, he 
envisages that this way of writing will emphasise description rather than explanation (Shotter 
2005a and 2005b). Just as Wittgenstein recommended, we will need to find ways of writing 
that attract our attention to those aspects of the world that are so familiar that we routinely 
fail to notice them.  
 
Shotter (2005b) has taken the idea of poetics from Goethe, who envisaged constructing a 
“delicate empiricism”. In contrast to most empiricists from the Enlightenment tradition, 
Goethe did not seek to isolate objects and then treat them as if they were static self-contained 
entities that could be categorised according to their enduring intrinsic properties. Instead, 
Goethe insisted on the delicate task of seeking to discover “the relations between the different 
aspects exhibited in a dynamic world of internally inter-related, continuously changing 
activities” (Shotter, 2005b, p. 135). Interestingly, Shotter quotes from Cassirer who suggested 
that Goethe invented the term ‘morphology’ to describe the study of  objects which 
themselves continually change while constantly interacting with other objects (Cassirer, 
1963). Goethe’s delicate empiricism requires a delicate morphology which itself must be 
rhetorical and responsive, for we must describe processes that are constantly changing rather 
than applying a single category to a supposedly enduring object. It is not as if we need a new 
methodological instrument to examine humans, for, as Goethe stressed, the human is the most 
precise scientific instrument that has ever been invented. Rather, the new methodology that 
we need is a rhetorical practice so that we can learn to write with sensitivity and delicacy as 
we describe the complex, interrelated uniqueness of what we are observing. 
 
A conventional psychologist might then respond to Shotter ‘Well, that is all very well but 
what sort of theoretical concepts will your method of poetics require in order to create 
satisfactory theories?’ The question, however, would be misplaced. We can understand just 
how misplaced by referring to Cassirer’s contrast between traditional scientific language and 
Goethe’s morphological thinking. In Language and myth, Cassirer suggested that the 
concepts of physics have been designed to transform the world of perceptions into a coherent 
“epitome of laws” (1953, p. 27). Goethe’s morphological thinking, on the other hand, sought 
to find “pregnant moments”, or focal  points in the course of events, culling these “high  
moments” from the “uniform stream of time” (1953, pp. 27-8). For Shotter, the exchange 
between Cherrie and Dr Ashong’s patient is one such high moment, filled with meaning. 
 
In his Essay on man, Cassirer distinguished between scientific thinking and the sort of 
thinking which holds a moment in time, directing attention to that moment. According to 
Cassirer, most scientific thinking is dependent upon categorization. Because science absorbs 
the particular into general categories “science means abstraction and abstraction is always an 
impoverishment of reality” (Cassirer, p. 143). Cassirer contrasts scientific thinking with 
artistic thinking. Whereas science abstracts and impoverishes, art intensifies and enriches. 
Unlike science which abbreviates reality, art “is an intensification of reality” and, according 
to Cassirer, it “may be described as a continuous process of concretion” (p. 143). Thus, 
Goethe’s delicate empiricism involves the use of language that artistically intensifies reality. 
 
Cassirer’s purpose is not merely to contrast artistic, morphological thinking with theoretical, 
categorical thinking. His deeper purpose is to show that the latter involves the former. A 
number of years ago, I argued a somewhat similar point (Billig, 1987) when suggesting that 
categorizing is not just the rhetorical opposite of particularizing but that categorizing cannot 
be performed rhetorically without the opposing skills of particularizing. However, Cassirer 
goes much further than arguing that categorization cannot be the basic conceptual skill on 
which language and human thinking must be based. Indeed he reverses the conventional 
philosophical balance between categorization and particularization or between theoretical and 
mythic thinking, and thereby between science and art. For Cassirer, science does not 
transcend myth, but rests upon it. Without the artistic and mythic skills of intensifying reality 
there could be no science for it is the mythic skills, rather than the skills of formulating 
general categories, that are fundamental both historically and psychologically. Moreover, 
Cassirer used Goldstein’s psychological work with brain damaged patients to illustrate that 
human perception is always more than perception: we perceive objects in ways that permit us 
to isolate the particular from the stream of time (Cassirer, 1962; see also Cassirer, 1999, for 
two letters on this topic to Goldstein). 
 
From this perspective, Goethe, as well as Shotter, are not being anti-scientific when they 
advocate a poetics of writing: they are showing the importance of morphological thinking, 
not just within human activity, but also for understanding that activity. Using Cassirer’s 
distinctions, this means that we should avoid ways of writing that lock up the high moments 
of human life within concepts that simplify and deaden; instead, we should attempt to write in 
delicate ways that intensify and make concrete the special moments of life. 
 
 
Shotter and Cassirer 
Shotter recounts that the late Basil Bernstein introduced him to Cassirer’s work (Shotter, 
2005a). It was a felicitous introduction for there are a number of parallels between Cassirer 
and Shotter. Both of them are deeply philosophical in their thinking but neither sees 
philosophy as a self-contained technical discipline. Cassirer believed that the proper study of 
philosophy was the nature of humankind. To this end, philosophers should not just be 
philosophers but they should concern themselves with science, psychology, anthropology etc. 
This is why Cassirer called his work, ‘anthropological philosophy’. Despite being ignored by 
mainstream psychologists, Shotter remains committed to studying psychological matters, but 
not to promoting psychology as a formal academic discipline. His way of writing psychology 
illustrates that conventional psychology on its own is insufficient for understanding 
psychological questions. Shotter is continually quoting from his philosophical textual friends, 
supporting in rhetorical practice Goldstein’s comment that there is no valid demarcation 
between philosophy and physiological psychology (Goldstein, 1951, p. 9). 
 
This is where the notion of a ‘textual friend’ becomes important. Shotter used the concept in 
the penultimate footnote of Cultural politics (1993b, p. 232). He recounted that his actual 
friends, Ken and Mary Gergen, often wondered why his writing contained so many 
quotations: “When are you going to write in your own words?” they would ask him. Shotter’s 
reply is that he was conversing with writers, who are his “textual friends”, adding that “I need 
to sense their words” (p. 232). The Gergens’ question could have been addressed to Cassirer. 
His books are rich in quotations, as Cassirer presented his own views through considering the 
works of others. Indeed, in some of his more historical works of philosophy, it is sometimes 
hard to detect Cassirer’s view of the philosophers whom he discusses at scholarly length. His 
readers, too, may have often wondered when he was going to write in his own words. 
However, Cassirer’s style of writing was more than just a rhetorical quirk: it reflected his 
deep philosophical commitment to the humanist tradition (see Lofts, 2000, for a discussion of 
Cassirer’s style). 
 
Apparently Cassirer could quote by heart whole pages of philosophical writing. Anyone 
talking at length with John Shotter would be aware of his remarkable ability to summon up 
apt quotations during the course of a conversation. Such abilities are not party tricks, either 
for Cassirer or for Shotter, but they represent essential aspects of their intellectual stance. 
Robert Skidelsky (2011), in his brilliant analysis of Cassirer, calls Cassirer the last 
philosopher of culture. According to Skidelsky, Cassirer’s philosophical position constitutes a 
defence of scholarly, humane culture – a defence which can only be mounted from being 
positioned firmly within that cultural tradition. So, too, Shotter defends the philosophical, 
humanistic culture: a technical proficiency within a discipline, whether that discipline be 
psychology or philosophy, must always be insufficient on its own for it needs to be allied to a 
deeper intellectual humanity and a commitment to scholarly values. Wittgenstein may have 
wanted to free his readers from the philosophical tradition and, in consequence, avoided 
citing authors from that tradition. By contrast, both Cassirer and Shotter are themselves 
immersed within the traditions from which they copiously and generously quote. 
 
I can personally testify to John Shotter’s generosity with quotations. Most scholars are rather 
secretive about the notes which they make when reading important books. That is not, and 
never has been, John’s way: he has often sent me his notes, sharing the quotations that he has 
worked so long and hard to extract from difficult books and that exemplify the book from 
which come. In this respect, John personifies the cooperative, humanistic tradition that the 
best of his textual friends inhabited. He lives within the world of ideas and for him that is a 
world to be shared with others. As such, he does not belong to the competitive world of 
modern academia, in which individuals compete with each other to be noticed. John has 
always valued intellectual ideas for their own sake, not as a commodity to enhance 
reputation, career and citations. 
 
I do not know whether Cassirer was similarly generous with his scholarly notes. I suspect he 
might have been. There is, however, a crucial difference between Cassirer and Shotter. 
Cassirer’s intellectual reaction was always to try to incorporate philosophical opponents 
within his vision of culture. By trying to incorporate Heidegger’s thinking during the period 
when Heidegger was using his philosophy to support Nazism, Cassirer disastrously left 
himself little room for analysing how the cultural tradition, which he valued so much, could 
result in demonic politics. Shotter, educated in a later, more cynical age, has no such 
illusions. He remains fierce in rejecting those sorts of Cartesianism which in his view are at 
root illiberal and inhumane. He feels no obligation to pursue textual friendships 
indiscriminately or to incorporate all philosophies within the cultural traditions that he cannot 
help but personify. 
 
There is a continuing mystery: why should mainstream psychologists have treated Shotter so 
dismissively, even aggressively? When Cassirer famously debated in 1929 with Heidegger at 
Davos, students loudly mocked the former as they cheered the latter. It was as if Cassirer, the 
old-fashioned, scholarly and gentle academic, constituted the dangerous threat. Maybe the 
idea is not so outlandish after all. Scholarship remains a threat to those who want to constrain 
thinking. John Shotter should take pride in the fact that even today, after all those years of 
reading, writing and sharing ideas, he remains firmly on the margins, not tempted by the 
comforts of the centre.  
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